Africa's strategic corridors
Africa's strategic corridors come in rival pairs. The United States and the European Union back the Lobito Corridor to take Zambian and Congolese copper west to the Atlantic; a Chinese state company holds a 30-year concession to rebuild TAZARA and take the same copper east to Dar es Salaam. Morocco and Algeria each have a pipeline to bring Nigeria's gas north to Europe. Kenya's and Tanzania's new railways compete for the trade of Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and eastern DR Congo, and Ethiopia's can leave by a Chinese-built railway to Djibouti, an Emirati-run port at Berbera or, one day, Kenya's Lamu.
China lends for, owns or builds pieces of 13 of the 19 corridors in this register, more than any other foreign power, and all 13 pieces it leads are in service or being built. American money is in one, Lobito; European money or ownership in six. Across 37 countries the register holds 84 pieces: 39 in service, 19 being built, 11 approved, 12 only announced and 3 stalled.
The newest pieces are mostly on paper. The railway from Lobito into Zambia has a development bank's loan but no builder; Uganda's standard gauge line has its loans approved but a contract its army chief called cancelled; the Abidjan–Lagos highway has a treaty, an authority and studies but no money to build; the Atlantic gas pipeline has its West African agreement but not its investment decision.
Register compiled 12 Oct 2026 · 19 corridors in 84 pieces · 98 funders, owners and builders · 188 sources, each linked
- 19
- corridors across 37 African countries: 13 whose main line runs, 4 being built, 1 approved, 1 only announced, 0 stalled
- 39
- pieces in service of the 84 in the register: ports, railways, roads and pipelines
- 19
- pieces being built, against 11 approved and 12 only announced
- 13
- corridors with China as a lender, owner or builder; 6 have money or ownership from the United States or Europe
The map
Each corridor is drawn piece by piece, coloured by how far each piece has got, or, at the switch, by who pays for it. Numbers match the list beside the map and the table below; hover a line, a port or a number for the detail, and a corridor lights up on its own.
- North and West Africa
- 1Dakhla Atlantic–Sahel
- 2Nigeria–Morocco Gas
- 3Simandou Trans-Guinean rail
- 4Abidjan–Lagos Highway
- 5Niger–Benin Oil Pipeline
- 6Trans-Saharan Highway
- 7Trans-Saharan Gas
- East Africa and the Horn
- 8Central Corridor SGR
- 9EACOP
- 10Northern Corridor SGR
- 11LAPSSET
- 12Addis Ababa–Djibouti rail
- 13Berbera Corridor
- Central and Southern Africa
- 14Douala–N'Djamena
- 15Lobito Corridor
- 16North–South Corridor
- 17Maputo Corridor
- 18TAZARA
- 19Nacala Corridor
Pipelines are drawn from Global Energy Monitor's tracker and the Lobito Corridor's railway from OpenStreetMap; every other line is drawn through the towns it links, as published, not along a surveyed route. Borders, lakes and labels from Natural Earth. The map's colour is the piece's own stage; the list's dot is the corridor's.
Where each corridor stands
Every corridor of the register, by region and from west to east, with the latest that could be confirmed, its pieces and who is behind them. "Why it matters" says whose project it is and what it competes with; the tags say which published priority lists name it.
| No. | Corridor | Stage and pieces | Who pays and who builds |
|---|---|---|---|
| North and West Africa | |||
| 1 | Morocco's Atlantic Initiative for the Sahel and Dakhla Atlantic portMultimodal · Morocco, Western Sahara, MauritaniaAnnounced by King Mohammed VI in November 2023, the initiative offers Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Chad the use of Moroccan roads, ports and railways to reach the Atlantic, centred on a new deep-water port near Dakhla. Dakhla is in Western Sahara, a disputed territory that the UN lists as non-self-governing: Morocco controls most of it and calls it its southern provinces, while the Polisario Front seeks independence. The route south crosses it into Mauritania.Why it matters. Morocco's bid to become the Sahel juntas' outlet to the sea, as an alternative to the Gulf of Guinea ports they now use, and to win backing for its claim to Western Sahara (Mali endorsed Morocco's autonomy plan in July 2026 while reaffirming support for the initiative). The UAE signed a ports investment MoU in December 2023 that Morocco says covers Dakhla Atlantique, but no Emirati money for the port has been confirmed.Cost: USD 1.2 bn · Dakhla Atlantic port only, as reported by CNN. Morocco's Ministry of Equipment and Water figures cited by The North Africa Post put it at over USD 1 bn (MAD 12.5-13 bn); a 2021 estimate was nearly USD 1.4 bn. ↗The North Africa Post · Morocco World News · Hespress · Al Jazeera | Under construction2026-09Dakhla Atlantic port was 62% complete in June 2026 and is due for completion at end-2028, with operations from 2029. The Tiznit–Dakhla expressway has been fully open since January 2025, and on 21 September 2026 Morocco and Mauritania signed a framework agreement to rehabilitate and widen the 480 km Nouadhibou–Nouakchott road. We found no defined or financed route onward to Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger or Chad.
| Government of Morocco · own budget ↗Built bySGTM · builder, 2021 ↗Somagec · builder, 2021 ↗ |
| 2 | African Atlantic Gas Pipeline (Nigeria–Morocco Gas Pipeline)Pipeline · Nigeria, Benin, Togo, Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, The Gambia, Senegal, Mauritania, Western Sahara, Morocco · 6,900 kmA planned 48-inch gas pipeline from Nigeria along the Atlantic coast to Morocco, with up to 30 bcm a year of capacity, about half for Morocco and export to Europe through the Maghreb-Europe pipeline and the rest for West African markets. It is to be built in independently financed sections, starting with a northern section bringing Senegal and Mauritania gas to Morocco; a project company in Morocco (ONHYM-NNPC joint venture) and a governing authority in Abuja are still to be set up.Why it matters. Morocco's rival to Algeria's Trans-Saharan Gas Pipeline: both promise Nigerian gas to Europe. The Moroccan section runs through Western Sahara (Dakhla, Boujdour), whose status is disputed, and the UAE has said it will help fund the project.Cost: USD 25 bn · Whole-project estimate cited by ONHYM; one 2026 report gives about USD 27 bn. ↗MSGBC Oil, Gas & Power · CNBC Africa (Reuters) · Maghreb Online · Maroc.ma (Government of Morocco) | Approved2026-09ECOWAS heads of state signed the intergovernmental agreement in Freetown on 19 July 2026; Morocco and Mauritania are to sign separately later in 2026. Feasibility and FEED studies are complete, but no financing is committed and the final investment decision, targeted for Q4 2026, was still pending at end-September 2026; ONHYM expects construction from 2028 and first gas in 2031.
| Nigerian National Petroleum Company (NNPC) · owner, 2026 ↗Office National des Hydrocarbures et des Mines (ONHYM) · owner, 2026 ↗OPEC Fund · lender, USD 14 m, 2021 ↗Islamic Development Bank (IsDB) · lender ↗United Arab Emirates · lender ↗ |
| 3 | Simandou Trans-Guinean Railway and Morebaya portsRailway · Guinea · 536 kmA heavy-haul railway across Guinea from the Simandou iron ore range in the south-east (WCS blocks 1-2 near Kérouané, Rio Tinto SimFer blocks 3-4 in Beyla prefecture) to two new export ports at Morebaya in Forécariah prefecture. It is built to carry up to 120 Mt a year of iron ore and is meant to add passenger and general freight trains.Why it matters. Opens one of the world's largest high-grade iron ore deposits, with the ore going mainly to China; Chinese state and private firms (Baowu, Chinalco, Winning, Weiqiao) hold most of the project alongside Rio Tinto. Guinea's state holds 15% of the rail and port company and takes full ownership after 35 years of operation.Cost: USD 6.5 bn · SimFer's funding of the rail and port infrastructure only: USD 3.5 bn for its own 70 km spur and transhipment port plus USD 3.0 bn toward the WCS-built main line, WCS spur and barge port (SimFer funds 34% of the WCS scope during construction). WCS's own spending is not published. SimFer's whole project, mine included, is USD 11.6 bn. ↗Rio Tinto · Rio Tinto (RNS) · Rio Tinto Q2 2026 production results (SEC filing) · Ecofin Agency | 2026-09First ore left Morebaya in December 2025 after a start-of-operations ceremony on 11 November 2025. Rio Tinto says full rail commissioning was reached in Q1 2026, 2.2 Mt was shipped to China in H1 2026 (2026 guidance 5-10 Mt) and its own port was 85% complete in July 2026. The line carries only iron ore so far: it is designed as multi-user, and the operator CTG began building 10 passenger and freight stations in April 2026 for service by end-2026.
| Rio Tinto SimFer · equity, USD 6.2 bn, 2024 ↗China Baowu Steel Group · equity ↗Aluminum Corporation of China (Chinalco) · equity, USD 985 m, 2024 ↗Government of Guinea · equity ↗Built byWinning Consortium Simandou (WCS) · builder ↗China Railway Construction Corporation (CRCC) · builder, 2025 ↗Wabtec · builder, USD 700 m, 2026 ↗ |
| 4 | Abidjan–Lagos Corridor HighwayRoad · Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Togo, Benin, Nigeria · 1,028 kmA planned six-lane coastal highway of about 1,028 km from Abidjan through Accra, Lomé and Cotonou to Lagos, with eight border posts. It would upgrade West Africa's busiest trade route, which carries more than 50 million tonnes of freight a year and where trucks can take up to 17 days end to end.Why it matters. An ECOWAS project with the AfDB as lead arranger and EU grants behind its studies, and the first of the EU's Global Gateway strategic corridors in Africa. It links the coastal economies and the ports that serve landlocked Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger; China built the first finished piece, the Abidjan–Grand-Bassam motorway.Cost: USD 15.6 bn · Construction cost in the PIDA PAP2 prospectus; the same figure was announced as investment interest at the 2022 Africa Investment Forum. The PIDA PAP2 project page lists capex of USD 7 bn and 2026 ECOWAS coverage cites about USD 15 bn. ↗Ecofin Agency · African Development Bank · AU PIDA · AU PIDA PAP2 | Announced2026-06The board of the Abidjan-Lagos Corridor Management Authority (ALCoMA) held its first meeting in Lagos in June 2026, named a chair and admitted the AfDB as a non-voting member and lead arranger; the AfDB is discussing USD 500 m of catalytic capital. Feasibility and structuring work was 'near completion' in February 2026; no construction financing or works contract has been reported, and PIDA schedules the first construction phase for 2027-2030.
| African Development Bank (AfDB) · lender, USD 25 m ↗European Union · grant, EUR 9 m, 2019 ↗European Union · grant, EUR 45 m, 2026 ↗China Exim Bank · lender, USD 115 m, 2011 ↗Federal Government of Nigeria · own budget, NGN 71 bn, 2018 ↗Built byChina Machinery Engineering Corporation (CMEC) · builder, 2015 ↗ |
| 5 | Niger–Benin Oil Pipeline (Agadem–Sèmè) and the Cotonou–Niamey corridorPipeline · Niger, Benin · 1,980 kmA crude oil pipeline built by CNPC from the Agadem oilfields in eastern Niger to an offshore loading terminal about 15 km off Sèmè-Kpodji, east of Cotonou, designed for about 90,000-110,000 barrels a day. It is landlocked Niger's export outlet for crude; the parallel Cotonou–Niamey railway, begun by Bolloré, stopped after a 140 km Niamey–Dosso stretch that has never carried traffic.Why it matters. China's main asset in the Sahel: CNPC built, financed and runs the line through its subsidiary WAPCO, and Niger's oil revenue depends on transit through Benin, a neighbour it fell out with after the July 2023 coup. The route matches the EU's Global Gateway Cotonou–Niamey corridor.Cost: USD 1.3 bn · Niger section only (1,293 km), financed 80:20 debt to equity; no sourced figure for the whole line. ↗AidData · Ecofin Agency · South China Morning Post · Rigzone (Bloomberg) | 2026-08Exporting through the Sèmè offshore terminal since 2024, after a May-August 2024 halt over the Benin-Niger border dispute and a June 2024 rebel attack. On 18 May 2026 Niger and CNPC agreed to cut the transport tariff from USD 27 to 15 a barrel and give Niger a 45% stake in operator WAPCO; in August 2026 Sonatrach and SONIDEP jointly sold a Nigerien cargo loaded at the Benin terminal. The land border, closed by Niger since 2023, was still under talks to reopen in June 2026.
| China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) · owner, 2026 ↗CNPC Finance (HK) · lender, USD 1 bn, 2019 ↗China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) · lender, USD 400 m, 2024 ↗Government of Niger · equity, 2026 ↗Built byChina Petroleum Pipeline Engineering (CPP) · builder, 2019 ↗Bolloré · builder, 2013 ↗ |
| 6 | Trans-Saharan Highway (Algiers–Lagos)Road · Algeria, Niger, Nigeria, Tunisia, Mali, Chad · 4,498 kmA road network first proposed by UNECA in 1962, running from Algiers across the Sahara via Ghardaïa, In Salah, Tamanrasset, Arlit and Agadez to Kano and Lagos, with branches to Tunisia, to Mali and to N'Djamena. A trans-Saharan fibre-optic backbone is being laid along it: Niger finished its 1,031 km in November 2025 and the Algeria–Niger link was launched at Assamaka in October 2026.Why it matters. Algeria's road to the Sahel: it gives Niger, Mali and Chad access to Algerian ports and the Mediterranean, and Algiers now also builds road sections in Chad. No permanent body has the powers to coordinate it (UNCTAD wants the liaison committee, CLRT, turned into one), and its member states sit in different regional blocs.Ecofin Agency · Algérie Eco · Radio Algérienne · Ecofin Agency | 2026-07At its 77th session in Algiers on 8-9 June 2026 the Trans-Saharan Road Liaison Committee (CLRT) said the network is over 90% built and the Algiers–Lagos axis almost complete; the last unpaved stretch of the main axis, PK0–Assamaka on the Niger side of the Algerian border, was in works for completion in 2026. About 400 km remain on the Mali branch and two sections (97 and 85 km) in Chad; in July 2026 EBID approved USD 260 m for a 123 km section in Nigeria.
| Government of Algeria · own budget, 2026 ↗African Development Bank (AfDB) · lender, USD 185 m, 2013 ↗African Development Fund (AfDB Group) · lender, EUR 43 m, 2025 ↗ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development (EBID) · lender, USD 260 m, 2026 ↗BADEA · lender ↗Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development (KFAED) · lender ↗OPEC Fund · lender, USD 10 m, 2021 ↗World Bank · grant, USD 170 m, 2025 ↗ |
| 7 | Trans-Saharan Gas Pipeline (Nigeria–Niger–Algeria, NIGAL)Pipeline · Nigeria, Niger, Algeria · 4,128 kmA planned 30 bcm/yr gas pipeline from Warri in Nigeria's Niger Delta through Niger to Algeria's Hassi R'Mel hub, where gas would join Algeria's network and its export pipelines to Europe. Nigeria's 614 km Ajaokuta–Kaduna–Kano (AKK) line, phase one of the Trans-Nigeria Gas Pipeline, is the first step on the Nigerian side.Why it matters. Algeria's rival to the Morocco-backed Atlantic pipeline for Nigerian gas to Europe; it moved after Algiers and Niger's military government repaired relations in 2026. Algeria is building its own section and has said Sonatrach will also finance and build the Niger section.Cost: USD 13 bn · Whole-pipeline estimate cited in 2026; other estimates run from USD 10 bn. ↗Al-Monitor · Enerdata · Maghreb Emergent · Offshore Technology | Under construction2026-09Sonatrach began welding the new 1,210 km Algerian section at Aoulef (Adrar) on 4 June 2026, the day after the three partners adopted an updated feasibility study. Niger said topographic surveys of its 841 km section would start in early October 2026, with works in early 2027 with Sonatrach; the Nigerian section has no date and no final investment decision or financing for the whole line has been announced.
| Nigerian National Petroleum Company (NNPC) · owner ↗SONIDEP · owner, 2026 ↗Bank of China and ICBC · lender, USD 2.5 bn, 2020 ↗Built bySonatrach · builder, 2026 ↗Oilserv · builder ↗China Petroleum Pipeline Engineering (CPP) · builder ↗ |
| East Africa and the Horn | |||
| 8 | Central Corridor Standard Gauge Railway (Dar es Salaam–Mwanza/Kigoma, with Burundi and Rwanda links)Railway · Tanzania, Burundi, RwandaAn electrified standard gauge railway from the port of Dar es Salaam via Morogoro, Dodoma and Tabora to Mwanza on Lake Victoria, with a branch from Tabora to Kigoma on Lake Tanganyika and links planned to Musongati and Gitega in Burundi and to Kigali in Rwanda. It runs alongside the old metre-gauge Central Line, for freight and passengers.Why it matters. Tanzania's bid to win the transit trade of Rwanda, Burundi and eastern DRC from Kenya's Northern Corridor. Turkey's Yapı Merkezi builds the trunk with European export credit agencies (Sweden, Italy, Poland) and Standard Chartered, while Chinese state firms build the Mwanza, Kigoma and Burundi lots; the Burundi branch targets Musongati's nickel.Cost: USD 7.5 bn · PIDA investment prospectus figure for the whole Central Corridor SGR network (Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi, DRC links); press reports in 2026 cite about USD 10 bn for Tanzania's SGR. ↗AUDA-NEPAD (PIDA PAP2 prospectus) · Standard Chartered · The Citizen (Tanzania) · Railway Gazette International | 2026-09Dar es Salaam–Dodoma–Makutupora has carried passengers since mid-2024 and freight since June 2025. Lots 3-5 to Mwanza are under construction after Standard Chartered arranged a USD 2.33 bn package (Apr 2026), and President Samia laid the Tabora–Kigoma foundation stone on 20 Jul 2026; in Sept 2026 the Burundi link was still awaiting AfDB financing and the Rwanda link has none.
| Standard Chartered · lender, USD 2.3 bn, 2026 ↗EKN and SEK (Sweden) · guarantor, 2026 ↗SACE (Italy) · guarantor, 2026 ↗Sinosure · guarantor, USD 559 m, 2025 ↗African Development Bank (AfDB) · lender, USD 696 m, 2023 ↗Built byYapı Merkezi · builder ↗CCECC and CRCC joint venture · builder, USD 2.2 bn, 2022 ↗China Railway Engineering Group (CREC) · builder, USD 2.1 bn, 2025 ↗ |
| 9 | East African Crude Oil Pipeline (EACOP)Pipeline · Uganda, Tanzania · 1,443 kmA buried, heated 24-inch crude oil pipeline from the Lake Albert oil fields (Tilenga and Kingfisher) in western Uganda to a marine storage terminal and jetty at Chongoleani near Tanga, Tanzania. Capacity is up to 246,000 barrels a day.Why it matters. EACOP is landlocked Uganda's export route for its first oil, chosen over a route through Kenya to Lamu. Western banks and insurers have refused to fund it under climate pressure, so debt has come from African and Islamic lenders, Chinese lenders have been reported but not confirmed, and TotalEnergies and CNOOC carry most of the cost.Cost: USD 5 bn · Project cost as reported in March 2025; BankTrack cites USD 5.6 bn as of July 2025. Owners provide about USD 2 bn of equity, with USD 2.4-3 bn of debt initially sought. ↗EACOP Ltd · Energy News Network · The Independent (Uganda) via AllAfrica · BankTrack | Under construction2026-10UNOC put the pipeline at over 90% complete in Sept 2026, with 1,414 of 1,443 km laid and buried. On 11 Oct 2026 Ugandan officials said it will be ready to take crude by mid-December 2026, but first commercial oil slipped to before end-June 2027, blamed on delayed equipment shipments from the Middle East.
| TotalEnergies · equity ↗CNOOC · equity ↗Uganda National Oil Company (UNOC) · equity ↗Tanzania Petroleum Development Corporation (TPDC) · equity ↗Afreximbank · lender, USD 755 m, 2025 ↗Standard Bank · lender, 2025 ↗Islamic Corporation for the Development of the Private Sector (ICD) · lender, 2025 ↗Built byChina Petroleum Pipeline Engineering (CPP) · builder ↗ |
| 10 | Northern Corridor Standard Gauge Railway (Mombasa–Nairobi–Malaba–Kampala–Kigali)Railway · Kenya, Uganda, RwandaA standard gauge railway from the port of Mombasa to Nairobi and Naivasha, built by China and in service, meant to continue via Kisumu to Malaba on the Uganda border, then to Kampala and on to Rwanda. It carries containers and passengers alongside the colonial-era metre-gauge line on East Africa's busiest trade route.Why it matters. Kenya's line is China's flagship Belt and Road railway in East Africa: China Exim lent about USD 4.9 bn for Mombasa–Naivasha, then declined to fund the next leg, and Kenya converted those loans to yuan in Oct 2025. Uganda dropped its Chinese contractor for Turkey's Yapı Merkezi with Islamic, African and European export credit money, and the EU lists the route as a Global Gateway corridor.Cost: USD 19.2 bn · PIDA PAP2 cost estimate for the Mombasa–Nairobi–Malaba–Kampala–Kigali line with the Malaba–Nimule–Juba branch. ↗AUDA-NEPAD (PIDA PAP2 prospectus) · Capital FM · The EastAfrican via Zawya · Kenyans.co.ke | 2026-09Mombasa–Naivasha has run since 2017/2019 and made its first operating profit in FY2025/26 (reported Sept 2026). Kenya declared works on Naivasha–Kisumu–Malaba started on 1 Jul 2026 (CCCC/CRBC), but in Aug 2026 they were still at land acquisition and only KSh 30 bn of the KSh 502.9 bn needed is committed; Uganda's Malaba–Kampala line won IsDB approval in Jun 2026 and targets financial close in Nov 2026.
| China Exim Bank · lender, USD 3.5 bn, 2014 ↗China Exim Bank · lender, USD 1.4 bn, 2015 ↗Government of Kenya · own budget, KES 30 bn, 2026 ↗Islamic Development Bank (IsDB) · lender, EUR 651 m, 2026 ↗African Development Bank (AfDB) · lender, USD 650 m, 2026 ↗Built byChina Road and Bridge Corporation (CRBC) · builder, USD 3.8 bn, 2012 ↗China Communications Construction Company (CCCC) · builder, KES 700 bn, 2026 ↗Yapı Merkezi · builder, EUR 2.7 bn, 2024 ↗ |
| 11 | Lamu Port–South Sudan–Ethiopia Transport Corridor (LAPSSET)Multimodal · Kenya, Ethiopia, South SudanA Kenyan-led corridor from a new deep-water port at Lamu through Garissa to Isiolo, branching north to Moyale on the Ethiopian border and north-west through Turkana to Nakodok on the South Sudan border. It bundles a port, highways, a planned standard gauge railway and a planned crude oil pipeline, with airports, resort cities and a refinery site at Lamu.Why it matters. Kenya pitches LAPSSET as an additional route to the sea for Ethiopia, which relies on Djibouti, and as an export outlet for South Sudan, which ships its oil through Sudan. Its oil case weakened when Uganda chose the Tanzanian EACOP route; China's CCCC built the port and the Lamu–Garissa road, both paid for from Kenya's own budget.Cost: USD 22 bn · Approximate cost of the whole programme (port, roads, railway, pipelines, refinery, power plant, airports) as reported by Reuters in Aug 2023. Older estimates differ and there is no current official total. ↗LAPSSET Corridor Development Authority · Reuters via Engineering News · Fana Media Corporation · Parliament of Kenya | Under construction2026-10Lamu's three berths are in service and on 3 Oct 2026 handled the port's largest single-vessel discharge (about 5,200 TEUs). The Garissa–Isiolo road was 64% built in April 2026 and the railway is still at feasibility stage. On 1 Oct 2026 President Ruto said Dangote had agreed to help build a Turkana–Lamu crude pipeline; Kenya's February 2026 oil plan relied on trucks and rail instead.
| Government of Kenya · own budget ↗African Development Bank (AfDB) · lender ↗China Exim Bank · lender ↗World Bank · lender, USD 500 m ↗Dangote Group · equity, 2026 ↗Built byChina Communications Construction Company (CCCC) · builder, USD 479 m, 2014 ↗China Communications Construction Company (CCCC) · builder, KES 17.9 bn, 2021 ↗ |
| 12 | Addis Ababa–Djibouti Railway and the Doraleh port complexRailway · Ethiopia, Djibouti · 753 kmA 752.7 km electrified standard-gauge railway from Sebeta, on the edge of Addis Ababa, to Nagad near the Doraleh port complex in Djibouti, built by CREC and CCECC with China Exim Bank loans. It carries freight and passengers between landlocked Ethiopia and Djibouti, whose ports handle about 90% of Ethiopia's trade.Why it matters. China's flagship Belt and Road railway in Africa. Both borrowers fell behind on repayments and their loans were rescheduled (Ethiopia 2018, Djibouti 2019-2020); Ethiopia's China debt is now being treated under the G20 Common Framework. Ethiopia's dependence on this one route to Djibouti drives Abiy Ahmed's push for a Red Sea outlet of its own, which he restated when sworn in for a new term on 5 October 2026.Cost: USD 3 bn · China Exim Bank buyer's credits only, both signed in May 2013: USD 2.49 bn to Ethiopia (three tranches covering about 70% of the Ethiopian EPC contracts and rolling stock) and USD 491.8 m to Djibouti for its 100 km section. A total build cost of about USD 4 bn is often quoted, but we found no primary source for it. ↗AidData · China Railway Engineering Corporation · Capital Ethiopia · Ethio-Djibouti Railway S.C. | 2026-07In commercial service since January 2018 and run since May 2024 by the bi-national Ethio-Djibouti Railway (EDR) after the Chinese builders handed over. In February 2026 the two governments agreed to rail-link the Doraleh Multipurpose Port and the HDTL oil terminal by November 2026, and EDR said in July 2026 that the line now carries 50% of Ethiopia's exports and 24% of its imports. Ethiopia announced a debt-treatment resolution with China in April 2026.
| China Exim Bank · lender, USD 2.5 bn, 2013 ↗China Exim Bank · lender, USD 492 m, 2013 ↗Government of Ethiopia · own budget ↗Ethio-Djibouti Railway S.C. (EDR) · owner, 2017 ↗China Merchants Port Holdings · equity, 2012 ↗Built byChina Railway Engineering Corporation (CREC) · builder ↗China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation (CCECC) · builder ↗China State Construction Engineering Corporation (CSCEC) · builder, USD 590 m, 2017 ↗ |
| 13 | Berbera Corridor (Berbera port–Hargeisa–Wajaale/Togochale–Ethiopia)Multimodal · Somalia, EthiopiaA port-and-road corridor from DP World's Berbera port on the Gulf of Aden through Hargeisa to the Ethiopian border at Wajaale/Togochale, meant to give Ethiopia a second sea outlet besides Djibouti. Berbera lies in Somaliland, a self-declared state that Somalia considers part of its territory and that only Israel recognises (since 26 December 2025); it is coded here as Somalia (SO).Why it matters. A UAE port play (DP World, with UK development money) that competes with Djibouti for Ethiopian transit trade. It sits at the centre of Horn of Africa rivalries: Ethiopia's January 2024 MoU offered Somaliland recognition in exchange for coastal access, Turkey's Ankara Declaration of December 2024 returned Ethiopia to talks with Somalia on sea access under Somali sovereignty, and Israel's recognition of Somaliland has raised the stakes.Cost: USD 442 m · DP World's commitment of up to USD 442 m to develop and expand Berbera port under its 2016 concession; excludes the road upgrades paid by the UAE (ADFD) and the UK. ↗DP World · Somalia Today (citing Middle East Eye) · Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Türkiye (Ankara Declaration) · Atlantic Council | 2026-09The port's new 500,000 TEU terminal has run since June 2021, but a DP World official said in September 2026 that Berbera works at about 30% of capacity because the expected Ethiopian cargo has not come. Ethiopia's January 2024 MoU with Somaliland has not been implemented, and on 12 January 2026 Somalia's federal government annulled its agreements with the UAE, including on Berbera; Somaliland rejected the move.
| DP World · concession, USD 442 m, 2016 ↗Government of Somaliland · equity, 2016 ↗British International Investment (BII) · equity, 2022 ↗Abu Dhabi Fund for Development (ADFD) · grant, AED 262 m, 2017 ↗UK government (DFID, now FCDO) · grant ↗ |
| Central and Southern Africa | |||
| 14 | Douala/Kribi–N'Djamena CorridorMultimodal · Cameroon, ChadThe main supply route of landlocked Chad: cargo lands at Douala (or the new deep-water port at Kribi), Camrail's metre-gauge line carries it via Yaoundé to the railhead at Ngaoundéré, and trucks cover the rest to N'Djamena, either south via Touboro and Moundou or north via Garoua, Maroua and Kousséri. A rail extension from Ngaoundéré to N'Djamena has been studied for years.Why it matters. Mostly Western and multilateral money (World Bank, EIB/EU, AFD, AfDB) under the EU's Global Gateway corridor 5, while China financed and built Kribi port and Chinese contractors build the roads. Gulf players are moving in: the UAE's Etihad Rail has MoUs with Chad (May 2025) and Cameroon to update the railway study and raise funds, and AD Ports took a Douala terminal concession in February 2026.Cost: USD 816 m · World Bank Cameroon-Chad Transport Corridor project (P167798), approved February 2022: Douala–Yaoundé rail rehabilitation and signalling (USD 368 m), road works mainly in Chad (USD 389 m), the Ngaoundéré rail/road platform and trade facilitation; USD 538 m of it is IDA money. Excludes the EIB/EU/AFD Bélabo–Ngaoundéré rail works, the AfDB Ngaoundéré–Garoua road and Kribi port. ↗World Bank (implementation report, May 2025) · Business in Cameroon · KOACI · CPCS | 2026-09The rail-road route carries Chad's trade, but upgrades are slow: on 29 September 2026 Cameroon's transport minister told Camrail to speed up the World Bank-funded Douala–Yaoundé rail contracts (rail works expected 2027-2030), and no lot of the AfDB-funded Ngaoundéré–Garoua road was above 5% done in September 2026. The Ngaoundéré–N'Djamena railway is still unagreed: Cameroon picked a western route in June 2026, and Chad said no route had been validated.
| World Bank (IDA) · lender, USD 538 m, 2022 ↗European Investment Bank (EIB) · lender ↗Agence Française de Développement (AFD) · lender, 2023 ↗African Development Bank (AfDB) · lender, EUR 330 m, 2025 ↗China Exim Bank · lender, USD 525 m, 2017 ↗Africa Global Logistics (AGL, MSC group) · concession ↗AD Ports Group · concession, EUR 73 m, 2026 ↗Built byChina Harbour Engineering Company (CHEC) · builder ↗ |
| 15 | Lobito CorridorRailway · Angola, DR Congo, Zambia · 1,289 kmA railway from Angola's Atlantic port of Lobito to the copper and cobalt mines of DR Congo's Katanga and Zambia's Copperbelt: the 1,289 km Benguela Railway, the DR Congo's line on to Kolwezi and Lubumbashi, and a new line planned into Zambia.Why it matters. The flagship of the G7's Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment and the EU's Global Gateway: Washington and Brussels' answer to Chinese-built infrastructure, meant to carry critical minerals west to the Atlantic rather than east to Chinese buyers through Dar es Salaam and Durban.The White House (archived) · European Commission · AFC | 2026-08The Benguela Railway has run under the Lobito Atlantic Railway concession since January 2024, and its USD 753 m debt package closed in July 2026. The DR Congo signed its line to Mota-Engil in August 2026; the new railway into Zambia has an AfDB loan approved but no builder yet.
| US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) · lender, USD 553 m, 2025 ↗Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) · lender, USD 200 m, 2025 ↗Afreximbank · lender, EUR 175 m, 2023 ↗China Eximbank · lender, USD 362 m, 2004 ↗Lobito Atlantic Railway (Trafigura, Mota-Engil, Vecturis) · concession, 2022 ↗Mota-Engil Africa · concession, 2026 ↗African Development Bank Group · lender, USD 255 m, 2026 ↗Cassa Depositi e Prestiti (CDP), guaranteed by SACE · lender, EUR 250 m, 2025 ↗Africa Finance Corporation (AFC) · concession, 2024 ↗Africa Global Logistics (MSC) · concession, EUR 100 m, 2023 ↗European Union (Global Gateway) · grant, 2023 ↗Built byChina Railway 20 Bureau Group (CRCC) · builder ↗ |
| 16 | North–South Corridor (Durban–Johannesburg–Beitbridge/Kazungula–Lusaka–Lubumbashi)Road · South Africa, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Zambia, DR CongoOne of southern Africa's main road freight routes, from the port of Durban through Johannesburg to the Zambian and Congolese Copperbelt (Kasumbalesa, Lubumbashi). It splits into two branches: through Zimbabwe via the Beitbridge and Chirundu border posts, or through Botswana via the Kazungula Bridge into Zambia. It links South Africa's ports with the Zambia–DRC Copperbelt.Why it matters. A patchwork of national and donor projects rather than one sponsor: Japan (JICA) and the AfDB paid for Kazungula, South African banks and Afreximbank for Beitbridge, Zimbabwe's own budget for its highway, and a Chinese state-owned consortium builds Zambia's Lusaka–Ndola toll road. Lobito, TAZARA and Nacala are pitched as alternatives to this route and South Africa's congested ports; COMESA, EAC and SADC treat it as a Tripartite trade-facilitation corridor.SADC · JICA · allAfrica / The Herald · Bulawayo24 | 2026-10Zimbabwe reached financial close on the Chirundu one-stop border post upgrade in early Oct 2026 and CBZ Bank committed USD 100 m to the Harare–Chirundu road in Aug 2026. By mid-July 2026, 550 of 580 km of the Beitbridge–Harare road were upgraded and open; Zambia's Lusaka–Ndola dual carriageway was 78% complete in June 2026.
| Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) · lender, JPY 11.6 bn, 2012 ↗African Development Bank (AfDB) · lender, USD 76 m, 2011 ↗Zimborders Consortium · concession ↗Afreximbank · lender ↗Government of Zimbabwe · own budget, 2025 ↗CBZ Bank · lender, USD 100 m, 2026 ↗Standard Bank / Stanbic Bank Zimbabwe · lender, 2026 ↗Macro Ocean Investment Consortium · concession, USD 650 m, 2023 ↗ |
| 17 | Maputo Development Corridor (Gauteng–Mpumalanga–Maputo)Multimodal · South Africa, Mozambique, Eswatini · 630 kmRoad, rail and port corridor from South Africa's industrial heartland (Gauteng and Mpumalanga) to the port of Maputo, via the N4 toll road, the Pretoria–Komatipoort–Ressano Garcia–Maputo railway and the Lebombo/Ressano Garcia border. It carries chrome ore, ferrochrome, coal and magnetite exports from South Africa's north-east, plus containers and citrus. The private corridor body (MCLI) also covers Eswatini.Why it matters. Bottlenecks in South Africa's Transnet logistics have diverted mining exports to Maputo, which hit record volumes in 2025. The port is run by MPDC, controlled by Dubai's DP World and South Africa's Grindrod with Mozambique's CFM, under a concession extended to 2058. EU Global Gateway lists it within corridor 9 (Maputo–Gaborone–Walvis Bay), which continues west via the Trans-Kalahari road to Namibia.Grindrod / MPDC · Global Infrastructure Hub · AFD · Club of Mozambique | 2026-09In late September 2026 South African and Mozambican border agencies, with the World Bank, were working to clear multi-day truck queues at Lebombo/Ressano Garcia (up to 1,800 trucks a day), with a one-stop border post as the long-term aim. Maputo port handled a record 32.0 Mt in 2025, and in Feb 2026 Mozambique decided to tender the N4 concession that TRAC holds until 2028.
| DP World · equity, 2026 ↗Grindrod · equity, 2024 ↗Portos e Caminhos de Ferro de Moçambique (CFM) · owner, 2025 ↗Agence française de développement (AFD) · lender, USD 133 m, 2025 ↗European Union · grant, EUR 30 m, 2025 ↗Trans African Concessions (TRAC) · concession, ZAR 3 bn, 1997 ↗ |
| 18 | TAZARA revitalisation (Tanzania–Zambia Railway, Dar es Salaam–Kapiri Mposhi)Railway · Tanzania, Zambia · 1,860 kmA 1,860 km railway built with Chinese finance and technical support in 1970-75, linking Zambia's Copperbelt to the Indian Ocean port of Dar es Salaam. China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation (CCECC) will spend about USD 1.4 bn to rehabilitate track and bridges and buy new rolling stock, then run the line for 30 years. It is meant to lift freight from about 200,000 t to 2.4 Mt a year, mainly Copperbelt minerals for export.Why it matters. China's flagship corridor in the region: the original line was financed by an interest-free Chinese loan, and the revival was agreed at the 2024 FOCAC summit before Xi Jinping, Samia Suluhu Hassan and Hakainde Hichilema. It is widely reported as Beijing's answer to the US/EU-backed Lobito Corridor, competing for the same Zambian and Congolese copper, with Chinese miners CMOC and Zijin reported to be taking stakes.Cost: USD 1.4 bn · CCECC's investment under the 30-year concession: about USD 1.0 bn for track, bridges and workshops and USD 0.4 bn for 32 locomotives and 762 wagons (later reports: about 34 locomotives, 760 wagons, 18 coaches). An April 2026 report values the project at USD 1.24 bn. ↗Railway Gazette International · TAZARA · The Citizen (Tanzania) · Ecofin Agency | 2026-07The line runs at a fraction of capacity while it is rebuilt. The concession with CCECC was signed on 29 Sep 2025 (some reports say Nov 2025) and launched in Lusaka on 20 Nov 2025 with China's Premier Li Qiang. In April 2026 the Chinese side said final designs were almost ready and restated a three-year build; in July 2026 CCECC was mobilising and broke ground on a training centre and control centre in Dar es Salaam. No report yet of main track works.
| China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation (CCECC) · concession, USD 1.4 bn, 2025 ↗Government of China · own budget, 2026 ↗Government of Tanzania · owner, 2025 ↗Government of Zambia · owner, 2025 ↗ |
| 19 | Nacala Logistics Corridor (Moatize–Malawi–Nacala railway and ports)Multimodal · Mozambique, Malawi, Zambia · 912 kmA heavy-haul railway built by Vale and Mitsui from the Moatize coal basin in Mozambique's Tete province, across southern Malawi, to a deep-water coal terminal at Nacala-a-Velha, plus Nacala's general cargo port and Malawi's rail network. It carries mainly coking coal for export (capacity 18 Mt a year), plus fuel and general cargo to and from Malawi. Since April 2022 it is owned and run by Vulcan, part of India's Jindal group, as Nacala Logistics.Why it matters. Japan's corridor: Japanese lenders financed the railway in 2017 and JICA rebuilt Nacala port, and at TICAD 9 (Aug 2025) Tokyo launched 'Strengthening the Global Supply Chain through Nacala Corridor Development' for Mozambique, Malawi and Zambia, aimed at minerals supply chains. A link to Zambia would give Copperbelt cargo a short route to the Indian Ocean, competing with TAZARA and Lobito.Cost: USD 6.2 bn · World Bank estimate (May 2025) of investment in the corridor over the past decade: USD 4.2 bn for the Moatize mine, new and rehabilitated railway and Nacala-a-Velha coal terminal; USD 600 m for Malawi and Mozambique rail branch lines; about USD 1 bn of public road works; plus a USD 350 m Japanese package for Nacala port ↗World Bank · JBIC · Club of Mozambique · Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses | 2026-04The railway and ports are in service (about 13.6 Mt of coal in 2023; a monthly record of 1.4 Mt in May 2025). In Dec 2025 Mozambique, Malawi, Zambia and DR Congo signed a ministerial declaration to extend the corridor by about 2,400 km of new railway, and on 24 Apr 2026 Zambia Railways and Nacala Logistics signed an MoU to revive the dormant Chipata–Mchinji link.
| Vulcan Resources (Jindal group) · owner, USD 270 m, 2022 ↗Vale · owner, 2021 ↗Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) · lender, USD 1 bn, 2017 ↗African Development Bank (AfDB) · lender, USD 300 m, 2017 ↗Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) · lender, JPY 37.1 bn, 2015 ↗World Bank (IDA) · grant, USD 123 m, 2025 ↗Zambia Railways Limited · owner, 2026 ↗ |
Who is behind which corridor
The same backers, by kind. China lends for, owns or builds 13 of the 19 corridors; American or European money or ownership is in 6. "Other states" here are Japan.
| Corridor | China | United States | Europe | Gulf states | Other states | Development banks | African governments | Companies and commercial banks |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1Dakhla Atlantic–Sahel | Government of Morocco (own budget) | SGTM (builder) · Somagec (builder) | ||||||
| 2Nigeria–Morocco Gas | United Arab Emirates (lender) | OPEC Fund (lender) · Islamic Development Bank (IsDB) (lender) | Nigerian National Petroleum Company (NNPC) (owner) · Office National des Hydrocarbures et des Mines (ONHYM) (owner) | |||||
| 3Simandou Trans-Guinean rail | China Baowu Steel Group (equity) · Aluminum Corporation of China (Chinalco) (equity) · China Railway Construction Corporation (CRCC) (builder) | Government of Guinea (equity) | Winning Consortium Simandou (WCS) (builder) · Rio Tinto SimFer (equity) · Wabtec (builder) | |||||
| 4Abidjan–Lagos Highway | China Exim Bank (lender) · China Machinery Engineering Corporation (CMEC) (builder) | European Union (grant) · European Union (grant) | African Development Bank (AfDB) (lender) | Federal Government of Nigeria (own budget) | ||||
| 5Niger–Benin Oil Pipeline | China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) (owner) · CNPC Finance (HK) (lender) · China Petroleum Pipeline Engineering (CPP) (builder) · China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) (lender) | Government of Niger (equity) | Bolloré (builder) | |||||
| 6Trans-Saharan Highway | Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development (KFAED) (lender) | African Development Bank (AfDB) (lender) · African Development Fund (AfDB Group) (lender) · ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development (EBID) (lender) · BADEA (lender) · OPEC Fund (lender) · World Bank (grant) | Government of Algeria (own budget) | |||||
| 7Trans-Saharan Gas | Bank of China and ICBC (lender) · China Petroleum Pipeline Engineering (CPP) (builder) | Sonatrach (builder) · Nigerian National Petroleum Company (NNPC) (owner) · SONIDEP (owner) | Oilserv (builder) | |||||
| 8Central Corridor SGR | Sinosure (guarantor) · CCECC and CRCC joint venture (builder) · China Railway Engineering Group (CREC) (builder) | EKN and SEK (Sweden) (guarantor) · SACE (Italy) (guarantor) | African Development Bank (AfDB) (lender) | Yapı Merkezi (builder) · Standard Chartered (lender) | ||||
| 9EACOP | CNOOC (equity) · China Petroleum Pipeline Engineering (CPP) (builder) | Afreximbank (lender) · Islamic Corporation for the Development of the Private Sector (ICD) (lender) | Uganda National Oil Company (UNOC) (equity) · Tanzania Petroleum Development Corporation (TPDC) (equity) | TotalEnergies (equity) · Standard Bank (lender) | ||||
| 10Northern Corridor SGR | China Exim Bank (lender) · China Exim Bank (lender) · China Road and Bridge Corporation (CRBC) (builder) · China Communications Construction Company (CCCC) (builder) | Islamic Development Bank (IsDB) (lender) · African Development Bank (AfDB) (lender) | Government of Kenya (own budget) | Yapı Merkezi (builder) | ||||
| 11LAPSSET | China Communications Construction Company (CCCC) (builder) · China Communications Construction Company (CCCC) (builder) · China Exim Bank (lender) | African Development Bank (AfDB) (lender) · World Bank (lender) | Government of Kenya (own budget) | Dangote Group (equity) | ||||
| 12Addis Ababa–Djibouti rail | China Exim Bank (lender) · China Exim Bank (lender) · China Railway Engineering Corporation (CREC) (builder) · China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation (CCECC) (builder) · China Merchants Port Holdings (equity) · China State Construction Engineering Corporation (CSCEC) (builder) | Government of Ethiopia (own budget) · Ethio-Djibouti Railway S.C. (EDR) (owner) | ||||||
| 13Berbera Corridor | British International Investment (BII) (equity) · UK government (DFID, now FCDO) (grant) | DP World (concession) · Abu Dhabi Fund for Development (ADFD) (grant) | Government of Somaliland (equity) | |||||
| 14Douala–N'Djamena | China Exim Bank (lender) · China Harbour Engineering Company (CHEC) (builder) | European Investment Bank (EIB) (lender) · Agence Française de Développement (AFD) (lender) | AD Ports Group (concession) | World Bank (IDA) (lender) · African Development Bank (AfDB) (lender) | Africa Global Logistics (AGL, MSC group) (concession) | |||
| 15Lobito Corridor | China Eximbank (lender) · China Railway 20 Bureau Group (CRCC) (builder) | US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) (lender) | Cassa Depositi e Prestiti (CDP), guaranteed by SACE (lender) · European Union (Global Gateway) (grant) | Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) (lender) · Afreximbank (lender) · African Development Bank Group (lender) · Africa Finance Corporation (AFC) (concession) | Lobito Atlantic Railway (Trafigura, Mota-Engil, Vecturis) (concession) · Mota-Engil Africa (concession) · Africa Global Logistics (MSC) (concession) | |||
| 16North–South Corridor | Macro Ocean Investment Consortium (concession) | Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) (lender) | African Development Bank (AfDB) (lender) · Afreximbank (lender) | Government of Zimbabwe (own budget) | Zimborders Consortium (concession) · CBZ Bank (lender) · Standard Bank / Stanbic Bank Zimbabwe (lender) | |||
| 17Maputo Corridor | Agence française de développement (AFD) (lender) · European Union (grant) | DP World (equity) | Portos e Caminhos de Ferro de Moçambique (CFM) (owner) | Grindrod (equity) · Trans African Concessions (TRAC) (concession) | ||||
| 18TAZARA | China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation (CCECC) (concession) · Government of China (own budget) | Government of Tanzania (owner) · Government of Zambia (owner) | ||||||
| 19Nacala Corridor | Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) (lender) · Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) (lender) | African Development Bank (AfDB) (lender) · World Bank (IDA) (grant) | Zambia Railways Limited (owner) | Vulcan Resources (Jindal group) (owner) · Vale (owner) |
How this page was made
- The register
- A list kept by hand in corridors.json, compiled on 12 Oct 2026 from governments', development banks' and companies' own pages and the trade press. Every piece, status and backer carries the address it was read from. Anything that could not be sourced was left out.
- What counts
- A corridor is in the register when a published priority list names it (the European Union's twelve Global Gateway strategic corridors for Africa, October 2023; the African Union's PIDA Priority Action Plan 2021–2030; the G7's PGII flagships), or when it is one of the continent's large cross-border routes with a foreign state behind it. One railway built for a mine is in, Simandou's, because Guinea's Trans-Guinean line is designed to carry passengers and other freight too. Corridors that exist only as lines on a regional plan, with no piece funded, are not.
- Pieces
- Each corridor is cut into the few pieces that make it: a port, a railway, a road, a pipeline, a border post. A corridor's own stage is that of its main line; each piece has its own.
- Stage
- The site's five: announced (an intention, a memorandum, a study), approved (a board's approval, or an agreement between governments, a concession or a financing signed, with no works yet), under construction, operating, stalled (halted for a year or more, cancelled or suspended).
- Backers
- Who lends, gives, takes equity, owns or holds the concession, and who builds. A state-owned company or policy bank counts for its state: China Eximbank and CCECC for China, DP World for the United Arab Emirates. Private companies and commercial banks are a group of their own. The map's "who pays" colour is each piece's first-named funder; for a piece still on paper that can be whoever paid for its studies.
- Money
- Costs and amounts are kept as the source states them, in its currency and for what it covers. They differ in date and scope, from a feasibility estimate to a signed loan, so the page adds none of them up.
- Map
- Equirectangular, on Natural Earth's 1:10m borders. Pipelines from Global Energy Monitor's Global Oil and Gas Infrastructure Tracker (CC BY 4.0), as on the site's main map; the Lobito Corridor's railway from OpenStreetMap contributors (ODbL); every other line through the towns its builders name.